Do Firms Compete When Demand is Low? A Model of Spatial Differentiation by Alessandra Chirco & Luca Lambertini
s<1/4













if pj < pj
0






si fp j ³ p j
7References
Beath, J. and Y. Katsoulacos, 1991, The Economic Theory of Product Differentiation,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
D’Aspremont, C., J.J. Gabszewicz and J.-F. Thisse, 1979, On Hotelling’s ‘Stability in
Competition’, Econometrica, 47, 1045-50.
Hotelling, H., 1929, Stability in Competition, Economic Journal, 39, 41-57.
Rotemberg, J. and M. Woodford, 1991, Markups and the Business Cycle, in O. Blanchard and
S. Fischer (eds), NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 63-129.
Salop,S., 1979,MonopolisticCompetitionwithOutsideGoods,BellJournalof Economics,10,
141-56.
Stiglitz,J.,1984,Price RigiditiesandMarketStructure, AmericanEconomicReview, 74(P&P),
350-5.
6PROOF. In order to prove the above Proposition, it suffices to notice that if
and if Q.E.D.
A few remarks are now in order. For although demands overlap and thus in
principle competition is possible, firms find it optimal not to compete; they behave
monopolisticallyandthemarketisnotfullycovered.Furthermore,for asymmetric
Nash equilibrium emerges in an area where reaction functions are downward sloping and thus
strategic substitutability is observed. In such an equilibrium, the net surplus of the indifferent
consumer located at the middle of the segment is nil. Finally, it is most noteworthy that in this
case strategic interaction leads firms to adopt a pricing behaviour which mimics collusion.
3. Conclusions
The main finding of this paper is that firms’ propension to compete is inversely related to
the level of demand, here approximated by the individual gross surplus from purchase. There
aredemandconfigurationswhichmightsupport competition withpositiveprofits,andyetfirms
find it optimal to set prices in a monopolistic or at least quasi-cooperative way. This is in line
with that large body of the literature aimed at showing a procyclical pattern of competitiveness
and thus a countercyclical pattern of the real price, e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1991). Two
extensions,namely,theendogenisationofcostsandtheexplicitmodellingofindividualdemand
price responsiveness, as suggested by Stiglitz (1984), are topics left to future research.
p j £ 2s/3 s £ 3/4;
pj
0 ³ 1 s ³ 5/4.
s Î]1/4,3/4],
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5Then, for all firm i’s reaction function is
For all we have to check whether (ii) or (iii) holds. Clearly, (ii) holds for all values of
satisfying
while for all other values of case (iii) holds. Solving (9), we get
notice that
For finite values of s, we may now sum up firms’ pricing behaviour in table 1.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Notice that the strategic complementarity in prices usually observed in product differentiation
models(seeBeathandKatsoulacos,1991,p.22),ariseshereonly fors>9/16.However,strategic
interactiondoesnot necessarilyyieldsaNashequilibrium inpriceswherethelatterarestrategic
complements.Indeed, therelation betweenequilibrium prices andgross surplusis described by
the following:
PROPOSITION 2: (i) for p*=2s/3; (ii) for p*=s-1/4; (iii) for
p*=1.
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Ifinstead then there exists aprice such that the netsurplus of theconsumer
who is indifferent between the two firms is nil:
If firm i sets a price firm i gains monopoly profits as defined by (2); otherwise, if
she obtains the following duopolistic profits:
with intersecting at from below.
2 Therefore, we have established the following:
PROPOSITION 1: assume then, for any profits of firm i are defined as
(b)Derivationof thereactionfunctions. Thereactionfunctionof firmi isdefinedas theoptimal
choiceof pi givenpj. Taking into account theprofitfunction referred to in Proposition
1, three possibilities arise. Denoting with and the prices maximizing, respectively,
and whichareconcaveandsingle-peaked,thentheoptimalpriceis:(i)
(ii) (iii)
Consider case (i). We have if
implying
pj ³ ˆ p j.
pj < ˆ p j, ˜ pi(pj)
˜ pi = pj +2Ö ``` ` s - pj-1. (4
pi ³ ˜ pi(pj),
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2. Notice that for which coincide with when s<1. If as for
then for all and for all firm i’s profits are given by
pj < 2Ö `s -1, ˜ pi > 0 ˆ p j ˆ p j = s,
pj Î[ 2Ö `s -1,s], pi
M. s ³ 1, ˜ pi < 0, pi > 0
3s can be interpreted as the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income (or money), this amounts




settings emerge. For very low values of s, each firm’s demand is independent of the other’s, so
that the market does not allow for any strategic interaction, and monopolistic pricing is
necessarily observed. For higher values of s, demands overlap, so that some scope arises for
strategic interaction - although this is not necessarily exploited - and firms’ behaviour must be
studied by deriving their reaction functions in the price space.
2.1. Isolated markets
Since for the consumer located in 1/2 transportation costs amount to 1/4, it is clear that
for s<1/4 the profit accruing to each firm is independent of the rival’s behaviour. Thus, both
firms behave monopolistically, maximizing a profit function defined as follows:
where defines firm i’s demand. This yields:
2.2. Overlapping demands
If firms maypotentially competefortheconsumers locatedin anareaatthe
center of the linear city, which widens as s increases. To derive the firms’ reaction functions,
we have to proceed in two steps, defining (a) the profit function of firm i for any price charged
by firm j, ; (b) the optimal pricing rule for firm i given the price charged by firm j.
(a) Derivation of the profit function. First, notice that is actually independent of pj for
where for s<1, while for Thus, for any s,
s Î]0,5/4[.
pi
M = piÖ ``` ` s - pi; i = 1,2,( 2
















ˆ p j = 2Ö `s -1 pi =p i
M = piÖ ``` ` s - pi, pj > ˆ p j, ˆ p j = ss ³ 1.
1.Providedthatlocationsareeitherexogenousorfixedintheshortrun,thepresentanalysis
could be easily extended to both the case of n firms and that of the circular city described by
Salop (1979).
21. Introduction
The horizontal differentiationmodel introduced by Hotelling (1929) hasproduced awide
stream of literature focusing on how firms startegically exploit the possibility of choosing their
respective locations in the product space in order to soften price competition.
Two major points are worth stressing. First, the attention paid to product differentiation
anditsbearingsonequilibriumprofitshasleftmanyquestionsonthenatureofpricecompetition
insuchsettingsvirtuallyunanswered.Second,horizontaldifferentiationhasgenerallybeendealt
with under the assumptions of inelastic demand and full market coverage.
Thispaperisdevotedtotheinvestigationofshort-runpricebehaviourwhenanexogenous
shockaffectingnominalmagnitudesbringsaboutacontractioninmarketdemand,whichinturn
may induce firms to noncooperatively adopt price rules of monopolistic or quasi-cooperative
flavour. Thus, the present analysis gives a temptative but suggestive answer in the positive to
thequestionwhethertheintensityofcompetitionmaybeinverselyrelatedto thelevelof market
demand, as it has been informally raised by Stiglitz (1984).
2. The model
Consider a duopoly in which firms 1 and 2 sell a physically homogeneous good along a
segmentof unit length. Unit production costs are assumedto be constant andcan benormalised
to zero without any loss of generality. Consumers are uniformly distributed over the segment,
withtotaldensity1.Eachconsumerbuysatmostoneunitofthegood,drawingfromconsumption
agross surpluss - invariant across consumers - andpaying afull price pi+d
2, wherepi is themill
price charged by firm i and d is the distance between the consumer and the patronized firm.
Total demand is equal to 1, i.e., all consumers are served, if the indirect utility function
is non-negative for all consumers. In such a case, as shown by D’Aspremont et al. (1979), the
Nash symmetricequilibrium prices turn out to be whilethe equilibrium locations arethe
endpointsofthesegment,0 and1.However, thissolutionclearlyrequires Provided that
location can be regarded as a long run choice, one might argue how firms’ pricing behaviour
may be affected by an exogenous shock reducing s below the above threshold level. Given that
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Abstract
In a spatial competition model, changes in firms’ competitive behaviour may occur when
the hypothesis that individual gross surplus is positive in equilibrium is relaxed. We prove that
there exists a region of the relevant parameter where firms’ behaviour mimics collusion, while
in another range they find it optimal to isolate from each other and behave monopolistically.
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